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Abstract
The UK student loans system is in crisis and the government plans to sell off student loans to
corporate purchasers. Such loan sales disadvantage government, the taxpayer and student
borrowers. The government should give student borrowers the ‘right to buy’ their own loans for
the same price the government is prepared to sell those loans to corporate purchasers. If
borrowers purchased their own loans, disadvantages of loan sales would transform into
advantages. The ‘right to buy’ can fairly be extended to all borrowers, regardless of whether
their loans are being sold; this is done by extending the ‘right to buy’ as a ‘right to reduce’
student loans. The ‘right to reduce’ also provides a solution to the problem of how to ‘deal
with’ existing student debt. Because the ‘right to buy’ and the ‘right to reduce’ both follow
government’s pricing for loan sales, they should be universally acceptable; moreover,
government, taxpayers and borrowers would be better off.
Keywords
Student loans, tuition fees, student finance, loan sales, student loan sales, right to buy
Executive summary
The UK’s student finance system is inequitable and in crisis. Nevertheless, in February 2017
the Conservative government announced that the process to start selling more student loans
to private investors had begun. Student loan sales disadvantage student borrowers, taxpayers
and the economy. When the government sells student loans to private investors, it sells them
for a fraction of their ‘face value’.
This paper recommends that affected student borrowers be given the ‘right to buy’ their
own loans for the same fractional price that the government is prepared to sell their loans to
private investors. Giving student borrowers the ‘right to buy’ would transform disadvantages of
loan sales into advantages for student borrowers, taxpayers and the economy while
unburdening student borrowers from punitive debt.
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The government would be no worse off. Because the ‘right to buy’ formula is based on
loan sales proposed and priced by the government, the cost parameters must inevitably be
acceptable to government. A refusal to allow student borrowers this ‘right to buy’ would
indicate that the government prioritises corporate wealth over the nation’s education.
The justice of student borrowers having the same ‘right to buy’ as private investors
implies that if some borrowers have the ‘right to buy’, so should others, even if their loans are
not being sold. Therefore, this paper outlines a ‘right to reduce’ for borrowers whose loans are
not being sold. The ‘right to reduce’ is substantively equivalent to the ‘right to buy’. Being
predicated upon government’s own pricing for student loan sales, the ‘right to reduce’ should
also be universally acceptable. The addition of detailed supportive mechanisms should ensure
that the less well-off have equal access to the ‘right to buy’ and ‘right to reduce’. These
solutions provide a way of reducing student borrowers’ debts while student funding is returned
to an equitable system and/or tuition fees are abolished.
Introduction: Student loans and the history of loan sales
Higher education in Britain used to be free. But since the 1990s, the British government has
largely absolved itself from the role of prime funder of higher education with the introduction
of student loans for tuition fees and maintenance.1 The greater responsibility of funding the
nation’s higher education has been transferred from government to students and remains with
student borrowers for the duration of their loans – potentially more than thirty years after
graduation. Students borrow tuition fee and maintenance loans from the government, the
latter since 2016 when maintenance grants were abolished (Figure 1). Student borrowers
repay the government the amount lent and interest and costs on top, until the loans are repaid
or end, by being written off after 30 years of payments. Loan terms are deliberately
unregulated and widely regarded as unfairly punitive; for example, students are charged an
extortive 6.1% interest rate, compounded monthly.2 Financial pressure on student borrowers is
significant.
Figure 1. Lender/borrower structure of the student loans system. Source: Author's own.
Lender = the government, acting through any person on its behalf (such as the Student
Loans Company [SLC]); and Borrower = student borrowers, referenced as ‘student borrowers’
or ‘borrowers’ (some as school children when taking up loans).
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As more students took out loans, the government regarded the loans with a seller’s eye,
and in 1998 and 1999, the government began selling the student loans. In 2013, the
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) announced the sale to Erudio of
“outstanding student loans owed by around a quarter of a million borrowers for £160 million”
(BIS, 2013: paras. 2 and 3). This transaction highlighted the practice of the government
accepting a sale price, which was only a fraction of the ‘face value’ of the loans; the loans
Erudio purchased for £160 million had a ‘face value’ of around £890 million (BIS, 2013: note
6). In the 2016 Autumn Statement, the Chancellor stated that the government “is continuing
to pursue the sale of the pre-2012 income contingent repayment student loan book” (HM
Treasury, 2016: para. 1.65). Then, in February 2017, it announced that, “The process to start
selling part of the English student loan book … has begun” (DfE, 2017: para. 2). The
government proposes to do this transaction by way of securitisation (DfE, 2017: note. 8). In
crude terms, securitisation is a finance structure that pools assets and repackages them into
interest-bearing securities: student loans are the assets to be pooled together and sold to a
purchaser who repackages them into interest-bearing securities. These securities are then
sold to investors. Investors’ return originates from students’ payments under their loans and
any additional payments, for example from the government seller. The purchaser is often a
special-purpose vehicle set up to buy the loans, repackage and sell them. The government
receives the purchase price from the purchaser who pays investors using money received from
student borrowers under acquired loans. The more money the purchaser gets from borrowers,
the more profit it makes.
It is typical for the sale price of the loans to be calculated referencing the ‘face value’ of
the loans.3 Erudio’s payment of £160 million for student loans with a ‘face value’ of £890m
was only 18% (BIS, 2013: notes. 6 and 4). Most loans that Erudio purchased belonged to
borrowers who were “not meeting their obligations under the terms of the loan agreement, or
who are earning below the deferment threshold” (BIS, 2013: note 5). Given that “more than
three-quarters of students can expect to have some debt written off, up from around 40%
under the 2011 system” (Belfield et al., 2017: 19), the Erudio percentage figure is used herein
as an example price for loan sales. In reality, the price cannot be accurately predicted: the
price varies deal to deal and is dependent on the specifics of each deal. For example, the
characteristics of the loan ‘basket’ being sold, such as the ratio of ‘good’ borrowers to ‘bad’,
and negotiating strength of respective parties. Whatever the specifics of the deal are, the price
paid by the seller will be a fraction of the ‘face value’ of the loans (the ‘sale fraction’). For
example, a student loan of £40,000 sold for a sale fraction of 18% would cost the loan
purchaser £7,200 while a loan with a face value of £55,000 would cost £9,900.
Why loan sales disadvantage student borrowers, taxpayers and the economy
In a loan sale, the government sells its rights to be repaid the loans and receive interest and
costs from the borrowers, in return for the sale fraction. Government’s receipts of interest,
costs and capital repayments are relinquished for ‘cash up front’; regular income from
borrowers’ payments over the remaining loan term is exchanged for cash, which is a fraction of
the value of such receipts. Once the sale is completed, the government is usually ‘out of the
picture’ (Figure 2), so far as the borrower is concerned. The purchaser acquires rights to be
repaid the loan amount and receive interest and costs from the borrowers who thereon make
payments to the corporate purchaser instead of the government. Because HMRC deducts
borrowers’ payments from earnings at source, purchasers easily collect money from borrowers.
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Figure 2. Lender/borrower/corporate purchaser structure of student loan sales. Source: Author’s own.
Corporate purchasers legitimately regard student loans as assets to generate profit and
returns for investors in the securities. But these aims conflict with the purpose of the loans,
which is to educate a nation without discrimination. A corporate purchaser’s incentive
fundamentally conflicts with the function of the loans, and loan sales disadvantage borrowers,
taxpayers and the economy, exposing them to risks.
Loan sales put borrowers at risk
Borrowers whose loans are sold are at risk of worsening loan terms, something allowed by the
Sale of Student Loans Act 2008 (SSLA). They also risk problems with the loan purchaser and
being unfairly ‘locked in’ to arrangements that do not keep up with advantageous changes
arising from public and parliamentary opinion.
Enhancing the sale process of student loans for government and purchasers, the SSLA
has a wealth of provisions giving government and purchasers wide powers. In contrast, the act
allows student borrowers to be subject to worsening loan terms when their loans are sold,
potentially passing on financial risk and burden to borrowers. For example, the SSLA allows
that transfer arrangements between the Secretary of State and loan purchaser can relate not
only to loans but also “some or all of the Secretary of State’s rights” [Section 1(3)(b)] and
include provision “For warranties or indemnities or other obligations of the Secretary of State”
[Section 1(4)(c)] – these can include provisions “that the Secretary of State thinks
appropriate” [Section 2(1)]. Worryingly, the Secretary of State also has power to give
undertakings around and relating to making loan regulations, including “to achieve a specified
result” or not “achieve a specified result”. Such provisions have teeth; not only can the loan
purchaser “enforce an undertaking by way of legal proceedings” [Section 2(5)(e)], but also the
Secretary has power to increase costs to students and this can apply retrospectively [Section
5(4) and (5)]. The nail in the coffin for borrowers is that the SSLA allows borrowers to be worse
off as a result of a loan sale. The act provides only that “in amending loan regulations the
Secretary of State shall aim to ensure that no borrower whose loan is transferred is in a worse
position” [Section 5(6)]. The use of the phrase ‘aim to’ is important: the Secretary need not
ensure borrowers are no worse off because of a loan sale; nor must the Secretary endeavour
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or make reasonable efforts to protect borrowers. There is not even a requirement of
reasonableness for the Secretary’s actions under the SSLA. The Secretary need only ‘aim to’
ensure borrowers are no worse off. This offers no effective protection for borrowers because
the Secretary could worsen borrowers’ positions while aiming not to.
In allowing regulations to be changed, the SSLA puts student borrowers in an invidious
position: adverse retrospective changes to loan terms could be imposed on them. Hammering
home borrowers’ vulnerability to corporate desire in the event of a loan sale, the SSLA allows:
“A reference in loan regulations to the Secretary of State as lender includes a reference to a
loan purchaser” [Section 5(1)]. Were student loans regulated this would not be allowed, but
the SSLA removed student loans from protective legislation including by Section 8.
In summary, the SSLA allows loan purchasers wide powers on a loan sale, including the
procurement of borrower-adverse and retrospective changes to loan terms. Loan sales risk
purchasers’ using and abusing the SSLA to elevate entitlement and demand from students
and government to return more profit; for example, by securing changes to loan terms which
increase receipt of the punitive compounding interest accruing on the student loans and/or
capital repayment. However right or wrong such an action might be, purchasers could take the
borrowers’ money first via deduction at source through HMRC and argue about it later. It is
concerning that to increase receipts under bought loans, a purchaser might seek to change
loan terms by increasing the repayment rate of 9% (of income over the threshold); lowering the
threshold for repayment (presently £21,000 and from April 2018, £25,000 for those who
started university after 2012); extracting additional payments under the loans via a higher rate
of repayment; and/or demanding that a portion of any lump sum receipts (such as inheritance
and/or capital gains) go towards loan repayment. The risk of a borrower suffering in a
corporate loan sale is heightened because the government has a track record of
retrospectively changing the terms of student loans and has not given borrowers a binding
commitment to protect them.
Problems with loan purchasers resulted in previous loan sales not running smoothly. The
“catalogue of problems” (Media FHE, 2013: para. 9) reported after Erudio took over its loan
book included: difficulty deferring loans; a change of policy regarding information being
registered with credit reference agencies; payments being taken by mistake; failing to send
deferral forms and then demanding early payments; and risking borrowers’ ability to get
mortgages or borrow for big purchases later in life (Erudio wrote “to around 45,000 people
who deferred repayments to say their details would be given to credit reference agencies”
[Lunn, 2014]). One forum, moneysavingexpert.com “runs to 259 pages of complaints” (Lunn,
2016) and Lewis (2014: para. 3) wrote that the forum “is rammed with former students who
are struggling with Erudio”.
The student loan system and mental health
Student loans can contribute to mental ill health.4 Students graduating with the largest loans
tend to be the less well off, especially since maintenance grants were replaced with loans,
forcing the less well off into twice as much debt as their better off peers. This institutionalised
discrimination against the less well off makes education inequitable and uneven in its
accessibility. Callender and Jackson (2005: 15) report a bitter irony: “Students from poorer
backgrounds are more debt averse than those from other social classes”, yet they expect to
graduate with roughly double the debt and costs of those from better-off families (£60,000 for
a three-year course because they have maintenance loans as well as tuition loans). It is a
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corollary that mental ill health of affected borrowers will be accentuated by loan sales which
place loans in a profit driven culture. For example, borrowers of sold loans are at risk of
adverse changes imposed by or for the purchaser. Further, such borrowers have their loan
terms ‘crystallised’ on the sale and a corporate purchaser will be reluctant to accept loan
changes which reduce profits from acquired loans (unless the purchaser is ‘compensated’).
Borrower-friendly changes to unsold loans are expected but borrowers of sold loans are ‘locked
in’ to loan terms and risk not benefiting from such changes. Borrowers whose loans are sold
risk a ‘double whammy’ of purchaser driven adverse changes and crystallised loan terms.
Such borrowers are therefore at higher risk of mental ill health and stress.
Coinciding with increasing financial pressure on students from higher tuition fees and
maintenance loans, more students are dropping out of university including because of mental
health problems. In 2016, 36% of students said they “worry about their finances to such an
extent that [it] is affecting their mental health” (Future Finance, 2016: para. 1). Additionally, in
2017, “75% of students polled who receive a maintenance loan feel stressed about the
amount of debt they are accumulating while studying, the effects of which are wide reaching”
(Intelligent Environments, 2017: para. 3). When monthly loan payments negatively impact
borrowers’ ability to pay their bills, this stresses borrowers (Andrews, 2004: 510, 511).
Because a loan sale ‘crystallises’ loan terms, borrowers are ‘locked in’ to a debt-dictated life.
Cruelly, debt-averse borrowers can be subject to prolonged debt and lasting difficulty making
ends meet, which impacts mental ill health.
Borrowers' mental ill health risks associated with student loans is exacerbated by debt
not being ‘meaningful’. There may be some ‘meaning’ in tuition fee debt used to actually pay
for tuition fees, but arbitrary interest compounded monthly incrementally increases the size
and costs of student loans, making them last longer (Clarke, 2017) and creating an extra
portion of ‘compounded’ debt which is not used to pay tuition fees but benefits the loan
purchaser and investors. In February 2017, the Department for Education admitted, “loans
which are being sold have already been in repayment for over 10 years, and much of the
original value of the loans has already been paid back to government” (DfE, 2017: note 5). The
extra and enlarging ‘compounded’ loan portion cannot reasonably have meaning for borrowers
and will therefore be more stressful and associated with greater mental ill health and societal
costs. Ultimately, these costs fall upon the taxpayer. It may be too early for research to
unequivocally quantify the damage to borrowers’ mental health because of loan sales, but that
does not detract from the reality of it for those suffering.
Parliamentary opinion is turning against student loans
Reflecting the public’s growing dissatisfaction with the student loan system, parliament has
now also begun to criticise the system. The collective power of public and parliamentary
opinion is likely to force borrower friendly changes to alleviate the crisis, but borrowers whose
loans are sold risk being unfairly ‘locked in’ to unregulated and unfair loans and unable to
benefit from borrower-friendly changes to loan terms, while borrowers of unsold loans benefit
from positive changes.
Before the 2017 general election, parliamentary criticism of the system was growing. The
House of Lords made its views clear on 5 April 2017, passing a Motion to Regret:
“retrospectively changed loan conditions for existing students are further incremental burdens
on students that risk worsening the opportunities for young people from low-income
backgrounds” (House of Lords, 2017: Columns 1102, 1116-18). The understanding that
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student loans are a debt trap was widening, and was even shared by a Conservative party MP
who used such terminology emailing a constituent (“I understand you to be saying that you
have to earn £41k just to ‘chip away’ at the underlying debt figure, because of compounding
[interest]. I am looking into this. If that were correct, I agree that this could create a debt
trap”). The political landscape for student finance was changed by Labour’s general election
manifesto promise to abolish tuition fees and return maintenance grants. The Liberal
Democrat, Green and UKIP manifestos also addressed the finance system. Labour’s position
won younger votes and eroded the Conservative majority. Henceforth, no party can afford to
ignore student finance if it wishes to command power.
Not only did the election result ignite interest in changing the system, it also amplified
political voices. On 1 July 2017, Conservative minister Damian Green said of students facing
big debts: “I think this is clearly a huge issue ... It may well be that this is a national debate
that we need to have” (Grierson, 2017: para. 8). Lord Adonis, a former education minister,
challenged the student finance system, accusing universities of running a tuition fees cartel
and asking the Competition and Markets Authority to investigate (Woolcock, 2017: paras. 1
and 2). He broadened debate around the finance system on 28 June 2017, writing in The
Times, “Tuition fees are being killed off by university greed … VCs need to start planning for
real austerity. The flow of money from £9,000 fees will soon dry up” (Adonis, 2017). On 17
August, a former Chief of Staff, Nick Timothy, wrote in The Telegraph that tuition fees are a
“pointless Ponzi scheme” which are “blighting young people’s futures” and must be “radically
reformed” (Timothy, 2017). The DUP neither share nor are required to support the
Conservative approach to student finance. Political will and ability to improve the student
finance system was illustrated by the passage of a Labour motion in the House of Commons
blocking a rise in tuition fees, on 13 September 2017.
Simultaneously, the tide seems to have turned against austerity and aversion to tackling
poverty. Given that the student finance system and the sale of student loans to corporate
purchasers discriminates against the less well off (including because they have larger loans
and are worse affected), loan sales to the private sector could be something the House of
Commons will not support, once aware of the consequences of such transactions – and
awareness is growing. The July 2017 Institute of Fiscal Studies’ (IFS) report spells out:
“students from the poorest 40% of families graduating with the largest debts … Due to their
higher principal debt, students from poorer households accrue the most interest during study;
students from the poorest 40% of families now accrue around £6,500 in interest during study”
(Belfield et al., 2017: 18). The student finance system discriminates against poverty because
the poorer pay more than their better off peers for the same education.
Together, public knowledge and parliamentary opinion are powerful. Their simultaneous
force can reasonably be expected to exert transformative influence, improving student finance.
But borrowers whose loan terms are ‘crystallised’ by a loan sale may not benefit from such
changes, or not without difficulty. Such borrowers can experience on-going and far-reaching
negative consequences by, for example, being chained to expensive monthly payments. This
constrains their ability to own a home,5 because the Financial Conduct Authority’s ‘responsible
lending’ rules require mortgage offers to be based on affordability. Loan payments mean that
student borrowers qualify for smaller mortgages, while deductions from earnings for loan
payments inhibit saving for a deposit.
As well as adversely affecting student borrowers, student loan sales disadvantage
taxpayers and the economy. By selling off the loan book and losing its right to a 30-year
[plus/less] flow of repayments, the government sacrifices taxpayer income for cash upfront
that is a fraction of the value of the loans. As the IFS reported, “selling the loan book for its
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expected value does not ‘improve’ government finances” (Belfield et al., 2017: 35). Andrew
McGettigan (2015: para. 17) writes:
The IFS dismissed Osborne’s claim that you can finance new loans by selling old ones as ‘economic
nonsense’. You cannot sell an asset for what it is worth to strengthen public finances. You can only change
the timings: cash today or cash spread over thirty years and more.
Moreover, in July 2017 the IFS reported that “the long-run taxpayer cost of HE finance [Higher
Education finance] is now heavily contingent on the repayment of these loans” (Belfield at al.,
2017: 7). It seems irrational for the government to sell loans when it needs to receive long-
term repayment from them; especially when changes have been made to “the accounting of
the current value of student debt” to value future payments more highly (Belfield et al., 2017:
8). The government is essentially selling off cheap something that it needs and treats as being
of high value. As McGettigan (2017: 16) puts it:
A sale will likely make significant losses for government… the government may improve the headline public
finance statistics … but its misplaced valuation of cash today over holding the loan assets will lead at best
to a presentational gain, not a fiscal or economic one.
Calculating the true social costs of student loans
In HM Treasury Guidance, Lowe (2008: 7) states that when determining value for money in
assessing assets for disposal, public bodies should include “social cost-benefits of retention”.
Dwarfing the cost of student debt, which totalled £100.5 billion in March 2017 including
compounded interest (Britton et al., 2017: para. 5), annual mental ill health cost in England in
2016 was estimated to be £105 billion (MHT, 2016: 10). A portion of this mental ill health cost
is attributable to loan sales and should be assessed as a ‘social cost’ when assessing loans
for disposal.
Larger student loans with punitive terms saddle the debt averse less well off with more
debt and the likelihood of effecting worse mental ill health, associated costs of which include
treatment and lack of earnings – and relevant to those costs is the loan duration, which can
be more than thirty years. Such costs are reasonably expected to be more in relation to sold
loans, leading to mounting pressure on borrowers including from ‘crystallising’ terms and
increasing negative impact on borrowers. In 2014, when the OECD said that the “UK needs to
tackle the high cost of mental ill health”, it then cost the UK “around £70 billion every year, or
roughly 4.5% of GDP, in lost productivity at work, benefit payments and health care
expenditure” (Singh, 2014: para. 1). Mental ill health costs have increased contemporaneously
with student funding increasing its burden on borrowers through bigger loans and harsher
borrowing terms. Selling student loans will add to that cost where sold debts are more
stressful for student borrowers. If only 18,000 borrowers a year end up on disability benefit
and/or unable to work every year because of pressures from their sold student debt,6 this
could add anywhere upward from £594 million per annum to the mental health care bill,7
totalling nearly £20 billion by 2050. To give this figure some context, the IFS reports that in
2050, a policy of “writing off the post-2012 English tuition fee loans would “increase the debt
by around 1% of national income by 2050; equivalent to around £20 billion in today’s terms”
(Britton et al., 2017: para. 8).
Loan sales have more ‘social costs’: they add to deterrents causing falling admissions
and skills shortages in, for example, nursing and areas of economic growth such as film. If
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social cost-benefits were correctly factored into student loan sales, HM Treasury’s ‘value for
money’ test would not be satisfied for proposed loan sales. However, ensuring the test is
properly applied is difficult: the SSLA [Section 4(3)] only requires that a report on the loan sale
be laid before parliament “during the period of 3 months” from the date of agreement.
Taxpayer and fiscal risk
The taxpayer is also exposed to financial risk of an agreement to subsidise and/or
compensate loan purchasers since Clause 2(4) of the SSLA allows the Secretary of State to
“pay compensation to the loan purchaser”.
In the late 1990s … two £1billion tranches of ‘mortgage-style’ loans were sold to third parties … the
government committed to paying an annual subsidy to the purchaser. These subsidies were expected to
exceed the costs of keeping the loans on the government’s balance sheet by roughly £140 million.
(McGettigan, 2013: 178, emphasis added)
This cost was later revised to £125 million. Compounding interest charged to student loans
elevates purchasers’ expectations of receipts and a compensation payment may well be
correspondingly elevated, putting the taxpayer at more risk. Thus, loan sales expose the
taxpayer to unnecessary financial risk created by the government overcharging students. The
public purse also risks poor ratings on the securities issued pursuant to the sale, since
student loans do not conform to regulations. If the securities are rated poorly, their pricing and
saleability may worsen. This could mean that the securities are only attractive to purchasers if
they are ‘supported’ by government promises of ‘compensation’. Such ‘compensation’ will
ultimately come out of taxpayers’ pockets.
In addition, loan sales risk spending. The economy needs consumer spending and
“slower consumer spending growth” is predicted in the near future (PWC, 2017: 3). Student
borrowers have less spending when making expensive and extended loan payments. Sold
loans maintain and/or raise overall levels of indebtedness while interest payments and loan
repayments end up in the bank accounts of the “favoured few” purchasers, instead of oiling
the economy as consumer spending (Harari, 2017: 17). Moreover, government loses flexibility
in managing sold loans and cash receipts in the economy, thus putting the economy and
taxpayer at risk. A few get richer while taxpayers have an economy starved of consumer
spending diverted away from the taxpayer and into investors’ pockets. Student loan sales can
contribute to household debt entrenched at levels too onerous to repay. The government’s aim
to secure the economic well being of the country cannot be properly fulfilled via loan sales to
corporate purchasers.
How a student 'right to buy' would work for the less well off
Notwithstanding the problems and risks associated with student loan sales, such deals remain
‘on the table’. It would be prudent for the government to consider other ready buyers. It seems
obvious that any sensible government should offer student borrowers the same ‘right to buy’
their own loans as it offers private purchasers; not least because the government would
receive the same purchase price but such sales will not require ‘compensation’ payments. If
student borrowers were offered and exercised the ‘right to buy’ their own loans from the
government (Figure 3), they would pay the government the sale fraction for their loans. Having
purchased their own loans, such borrowers would not have to pay a single penny more in loan
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repayments, interest or costs. They would have rid themselves of their loans for a fraction of
their ‘face value’. Just as SLC handles loan repayments now, it could manage the mechanics
of borrowers’ loan purchases, liaising between borrowers and HMRC for the deduction of the
purchase price from borrowers’ earnings. Administration costs of selling to borrowers may be
the same, or less, than selling to a corporate purchaser because the administration structure
for sales to borrowers is in place.
Figure 3. Lender/student borrower purchase structure for student loan sales. Source: Author’s own.
It is imperative that the ‘right to buy’ student loans is equally available to less well off
borrowers; otherwise, they would be left with increasing student debts while the better off
improve their lives, debt free. Support is suggested whereby less well off borrowers buy their
loans using money from funds that advance them the loan purchase price. Advances would be
means-tested and interest free with a fair and affordable repayment schedule deducting from
earnings by HMRC and ensuring that the less well off do not pay more. The SLC is placed to
administer this and process payments, ensuring that advanced funds are applied to pay the
purchase price.
There are various fund options. One is to implement a variation of the existing £100
million ‘Rutherford Fund’ model announced by the government on 4 July 2017 to attract
researchers to the UK. Another is a new industry fund established with obligatory and tax-
deductible contributions or levy from [categories of] industry making most money from
graduates. There could be a new universities/further education ‘right to buy’ fund with
contributions from educational establishments – calculated by referencing student numbers,
turnover and/or profit, or following a formula such as adopted by the National Scholarship
Programme – whereby universities matched government funds into the Programme to support
less well off students at university (Dearden and Jin, 2014). Alternatively, there is an even
more straightforward method of implementing a fair ‘right to buy’ option for the less well off:
once the right is exercised, relevant borrowers’ indebtedness with the SLC is reduced to the
purchase price and a fair means-tested repayment schedule (interest free) of that price agreed
and implemented. This would be administratively efficient because the SLC manages student
loans and HMRC deducts repayments at source. HMRC would continue to take deductions only
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until the purchase price was paid in full. Or, a ‘melded approach’ could be adopted with more
than one fund involved and/or borrowers’ own funds being ‘topped up’ where appropriate.
Again, SLC would be the administrator. Whichever approach is adopted, ensuring borrowers
equal means to buy their loans reduces the risk of fewer less well off students buying their
loans. This would also maintain consistency in loan pricing because ‘poor risk’ loans would not
dominate the asset ‘basket’.
How the ‘right to buy’ benefits student borrowers, taxpayers and the economy
In a loan sale to borrowers, disadvantages of loan sales to corporate purchasers become
advantages: borrowers’ lives would not be dogged by monthly interest, costs and capital
repayments via prolonged reductions to their earnings; nor would they be ‘locked in’ to the risk
of increasing payments and disruption to terms of unregulated loans or significant restrictions
in raising a mortgage. Borrowers would have more spending power, improving their individual
lifestyles and those of their families; they would not endure mental ill health associated with
sold student debt. The human impact cannot be overstated. There would be advantages for
taxpayers, too. Taxpayers’ income would not be subject to additional calls from the government
to refill its coffers because having sold the loans, the government has lost a source of income
and must pay ‘compensation’ to the purchaser; the economy would benefit from increased
spending by graduates with more disposable income; and the taxpayer would benefit from an
economy enjoying increased tax receipts due to less mental ill health loss of work and lower
mental ill health treatment costs associated with loans sold to corporate purchasers.
Extending the ‘right to buy’ with a substantively equivalent ‘right to reduce’
Prior loan sales have proved the government’s acceptance of a fractional return on student
loans. Principles of fairness and equal treatment underpin borrowers’ ‘right to buy’ their loans
for the same sale fraction the government is willing to sell their loans to private investors. The
government should treat student borrowers equally and sell their loans to them for that same
price; it should not discriminate against student borrowers whose loans are not sold – the
‘right to buy’ should be available for all borrowers.
The ‘right to buy’ can be made available to all student borrowers without the commercial
exigency of a loan sale scenario. Existing student debt can be ‘dealt with’ by adopting the ‘right
to buy’ formula for other loans on a ‘matching price’ basis: borrowers whose loans are not
being sold have their loans recalculated in accordance with a ‘right to buy’ formula and
process, and with its supportive mechanisms. All borrowers could therefore purchase their
own loans as described, or have their loan indebtedness with the SLC reduced to the sale
fraction equivalent and agree a repayment schedule which is implemented in conjunction with
HMRC (continuing to) deduct repayments at source until full repayment or loan write-off (if
necessary), after 30 years. This formula is, essentially, the ‘right to buy’ replicated as a ‘right to
reduce’ and maintaining the use of pricing parameters known to be acceptable to government
because it is what government sold and/or is prepared to sell the loans for. The ‘right to
reduce’ fulfils the imperative that all student borrowers have equal opportunity to rid
themselves of student debt for their and the nation’s benefit.
It needs to be noted that there are two categories of student loans: Plan One (P1) and
Plan Two (P2). Some P1 loans have been sold and P2 loans have not been sold. P1 loans are
pre-1 September 2012 and P2, 1 September 2012 onwards. P1 loans are smaller and
cheaper than P2 loans. When P2 loans were introduced, tuition fees rose to £9,000 and the
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interest costs and charges rose; student loans started today are P2 – tuition fees are higher
and maintenance loans replace maintenance grants. Because P2 loans are bigger and charge
higher interest than P1 loans, without adjustments a borrower with a P2 loan would have to
pay more to buy their loan than an equivalent borrower of a P1 loan, because being large and
expensive bolsters P2 loan values and therefore the sales fraction is bigger: one fifth of a P2
loan would be higher than one fifth of an equivalent P1 loan.
When implementing the ‘right to buy’ and ‘right to reduce’, adjustment is needed to
minimise the inequality of pricing borrowers’ ‘right to buy’ and/or ‘right to reduce’ as between
P1 and P2 loans. For example, the sale fraction for P2 loans should be calculated excluding
maintenance loans, which should be written off. Calculations of principal and interest owed
under all loans should exclude value attributed to monthly compounded interest, which
distorts principal values (this distortion is worse in P2 loans because their interest rates are
higher than P1 loans). The impact of monthly compound interest should be removed from
borrowers’ indebtedness. Finally, all payments made by the borrower (including compounded
interest) should be taken into account, reducing borrower indebtedness appropriately. The sale
fraction is therefore calculated as a fraction of the loans excluding maintenance loans and
monthly compounded interest.
A calculation adjusted in this way makes the sale fraction as between P1 and P2 loans
fairer – whether borrowers have the ‘right to buy’ or ‘right to reduce’. It is not perfect including
because the levels of tuition fees under P2 loans are higher than under P1. Further
adjustment could take this difference into account. The removal of monthly compounded
interest from calculations would reduce the debt burden of student loans and the sale
fraction. If calculations demonstrate borrower overpayment, this can be refunded via tax
credits, to increase spending in and minimise cash drain from the economy. HMRC has the
structure in place to administer tax credits because it deducts loan payments at source.
The ‘right to buy’ and ‘right to reduce’ formula resolve the present student finance
conundrum: the political pendulum of tuition fees is swinging and yet to come to rest. On one
hand, the Conservative Party favour student loan funded higher education and student loan
sales, but recognise a ‘national debate’ about tuition fees is needed. Conservatives need the
student vote; transforming student finance to make university access equal and fair by
implementing a nationwide ‘right to buy’ and/or ‘right to reduce’ loan programme would assist.
On the other hand, the Labour Party says it will abolish tuition fees and reinstate maintenance
grants. Jeremy Corbyn said: “I don’t see why those that had the historical misfortune to be at
university during the £9,000 period should be burdened excessively compared to those that
went before or those that come after. I will deal with it” (quoted in Trendell, 2017). Labour
needs to address existing loans if tuition fees are abolished: these could be ‘dealt with’ by
adopting the ‘right to buy’ and ‘right to reduce’ formulae which, consistent with Labour policy,
reinstate maintenance grants. A ‘right to reduce’ is an innovative and fair way of ‘dealing with’
present student loan debts while bringing the student finance system out of crisis.
Conclusion
The government’s desire to sell unregulated student loans to the private sector raises big
questions: Why does the government ‘game the system’ of funding university education,
playing for cash up front by selling loans even when much of their original value has already
been repaid? Why does the government demand so much money from students when it is
happy to receive only a fraction of this amount back from private investors? At the very least,
education should not be charged to students at more than this fraction amount. Why sacrifice
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students, taxpayers and the economy for loan sales that “make significant losses for
government” (McGettigan, 2017: 16)? Is it proper governance to expose taxpayers to the risks
of selling student loans? And, having removed student loans from regulatory protection, is the
sale of student loans cynical exploitation of students? Such questions reflect the complexity of
student loan sales: they impact the finances of government, universities, taxpayers and
borrowers.
But these transactions are not just about money and statistics. Behind every loan stands
a person better educating him or herself to improve their life and benefit society. Selling
student loans to the private sector conflicts with the function of student finance to educate a
nation. The only winners are a ‘favoured few’ corporate entities seeking to extract as much
profit as they can from borrowers. The sale of student loans disadvantages borrowers,
taxpayers and the economy. Borrowers have no protection: their loans are unregulated and
legislation does not defend them. As well as prolonging borrowers’ deductions from earnings
for servicing expensive loans, history demonstrates that borrowers could be harassed following
a loan sale and subject to adverse changes to loan terms, including when improvements to
unsold loans are made for populist and/or political reasons. The mental ill health cost of
locking borrowers into a loan sale is human as well as financial; it may be difficult to quantify
with accuracy now, but that does not diminish its gravity or amount. In a loan sale to corporate
purchasers, taxpayers are exposed to the risk of paying ‘compensation’ while loan income, tax
receipts and spending lessen and the nation’s mental ill health bill increases. If borrowers had
the ‘right to buy’ their own loans, disadvantages of loan sales would become advantages:
student loans would disappear from borrowers’ lives. Borrowers would have more disposable
spending and tax receipts would increase, feeding the economy and improving borrowers and
taxpayers’ lives while the mental ill health bill from student loans lessened. Our nation would
be educated fairly and have the benefit of graduate wealth. The economy, taxpayers and
students would be better off.
Public and political opinion and economic sense are changing the student loan system.
The inevitable transitioning of the present system into a new, fair one can be supported by
implementing a ‘right to buy’ and/or ‘right to reduce’ loan programme to ‘deal with’ all existing
student debt. Being based on pricing used in loan sales and which is therefore within
government’s acceptable cost parameters, the ‘right to buy’ and/or ‘right to reduce’ should be
agreeable to all parties. At the very least, the ‘right to buy’ and/or ‘right to reduce’ provides a
starting point to return the student financing system to a state where students, graduates,
taxpayers and the government’s needs are put before the exploitation of education for
investors’ wealth.
Notes
1. Anderson (2016: 2): “Between 1962 and the 1990s higher education in Britain was effectively
free, as the state paid students’ tuition fees and also offered maintenance grants to many. In
1998 university fees were reintroduced at £1,000 per year. In 2004 they were raised to £3,000,
now converted into loans repayable on an income-contingent basis, but still regarded as 'top-up'
fees supplementing the state’s direct grants to universities. Following the 2010 election, the basis
of university finance was radically transformed as student fees, now raised to £9,000, largely
replaced the teaching element in the state grants”. In September 2016 maintenance grants were
abolished and replaced with maintenance loans, and in April 2017, further increases to tuition
fees were announced with the size of tuition fee loans increasing correspondingly.
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2. At the time of writing, “from 6 April after leaving the course until the loan is repaid in full, there is a
variable rate dependent upon income. RPI (3.1%) where income is £21,000 or less, rising on a
sliding scale up to RPI +3% (6.1%) where income is £41,000 or more” (SLC, n.d.: para. 2).
3. Note that the ‘face value’ of the loans is to be differentiated from the fair value. “The BIS annual
financial statements track impairments as they accumulate and are unwound. They convert the
face value of BIS’s asset into a fair value based on estimated future repayments. At the end of
March 2014, the face value of outstanding student loans was £54 billion but the fair value (the
net present value of future repayments) was estimated at £33.3 billion” (McGettigan, 2015: 28).
4. The Royal College of Psychiatrists states “Being in debt can make you feel … Hopeless, especially if
your debt is getting worse” (Dean, n.d.: 13). The Sutton Trust reports “58% [of 16-18 year olds] say
that they are concerned about having to repay student loans after their studies have finished”
(Sutton Trust, 2015: para. 4). Richardson (2017: 1) reports that amongst undergraduate students,
“Greater financial difficulties predicted greater depression and stress cross-sectionally, and also
predicted poorer anxiety, global mental health and alcohol dependence over time … Financial
difficulties appear to lead to poor mental health in students with the possibility of a vicious cycle
occurring”, concluding “students financial variables appear to lead to poor mental health rather
than mental health problems leading to a deteriorating financial situation. However, there appears
to be a bi-directional relationship between financial difficulties and global mental health and
alcohol dependence, with finances worsening mental health and vice versa suggesting a vicious
cycle developing” (Richardson, 2017: final para.). Ganni (2016: para. 1) reports how “Stephen
Buckley, from Mind, said tuition fee and student loan debt were major contributors to the rise in
students seeking mental health help”. Student loans can become “problem debt”, which has “a
profound impact on people’s well-being, with knock on consequences for their mental health, their
family life and their ability to work” (de Santos, 2014: 3).
5. In April 2014, the Financial Conduct Authority introduced ‘responsible lending rules’ following the
Mortgage Market Review (MMR). A spokesman for the Building Societies Association said: “Under
the new MMR rules, student loans are certainly considered to be committed expenditure and will
be included as part of the affordability assessment” (quoted in Boyce, 2014: para. 11). The
‘affordability assessment’ is part of the FCA’s requirement for ‘responsible lending’.
6. An estimate calculated by rounding down 2% of the 984,600 students who graduate with the
largest debts (tuition fees and maintenance loans): In 2015/16 the total number of students was
2,280,030 (HESA, n.d.: diagram 1, hover over relevant point); “41% of post-2012 students
received a full grant, 14% a partial one, and 45% no grant” (Bolton, 2017: 7); “984,600 students
borrowed £3.94 billion in Maintenance Loans in academic year 2015/16, an increase of 5% from
the amount paid at the same point in 2014/15” (SLC and DfE, 2016: 1, keypoint 4).
7. Allowing £33,000 per person, calculated by adding £18,000 lost productivity at work and £15,000
in benefit payments, healthcare expenditure, and so on. This does not include the human cost,
such as loss of wellness and living life as an earner and provider.
Legislation
Sale of Student Loans Act 2008 (SSLA) Legislation.gov.uk [Online]. Available at:
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/10/contents>. Accessed 21 October 2017.
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